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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Florida scheme for identifying
mentally retarded defendants in capital cases violates
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amicus curiae the American Bar Association (the
“ABA”) respectfully submits this brief in support of
Petitioner. While the ABA takes no position on the
death penalty per se, the ABA asserts that before any
defendant claiming mental retardation should be
eligible for the death penalty, the defendant should be
entitled to establish, pursuant to a constitutionally
appropriate test, that both his or her level of
intellectual functioning and conceptual, social and
practical adaptive skills fall within the definitions
used by recognized mental disability organizations for
determining mental retardation.
The ABA is the largest voluntary professional
membership organization and the leading organization of legal professionals in the United States. Its
nearly 400,000 members come from all fifty states
and other jurisdictions, and include prosecutors,
public defenders and private defense counsel, as well
as attorneys in law firms, corporations, non-profit
organizations, and government agencies. Its members
also include judges, legislators, law professors, law
students, and non-lawyer “associates” in related
fields.2
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus curiae certifies that no counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no
person or entity, other than amicus, its members, or its counsel,
has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this brief. Letters from the parties consenting to
the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk of this Court.
2

Neither this brief nor the decision to file it should be
interpreted as reflecting the views of any judicial member of the
ABA.
No member of the ABA Judicial Division Council
participated in this brief’s preparation or in the adoption or
endorsement of the positions in it.

2
Since its founding in 1878, the ABA has advocated
for the improvement of the justice system. The ABA
has long taken a special interest in the equitable
treatment of individuals with mental retardation and
mental disabilities and, since at least 1961, has
published numerous books and studies on mental
disability law.3
In addition to its focus on the treatment of
individuals with mental disabilities, the ABA has an
equally well-established concern that the death
penalty be enforced with appropriate procedural
protections and in a fair and unbiased fashion, and in
a manner that minimizes the risk that innocent
persons may be executed. In 1986, the ABA founded
3

These publications include:
•

Starting in 1961, the ABA issued several editions of The
Mentally Disabled and the Law, a comprehensive and
detailed overview of state laws in a wide variety of areas
affecting people with mental disabilities, including
criminal justice issues.

•

In 1973, the ABA formed its Commission on Mental and
Physical Disability Law (now known as the Commission
on Disability Rights) which, since 1976, has published
the Mental & Physical Disability Law Reporter, a widely
respected journal in the field of disability law.

•

In the early 1980s, in collaboration with disability and
clinical professional organizations, the ABA conducted
an interdisciplinary study of criminal justice issues
affecting defendants with mental disabilities, resulting
in the Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards,
which were subsequently incorporated into the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice.

•

In 1982, the ABA published Disabled Persons and the
Law: State Legislative Issues, which included proposed
model statutes for the states, with particular attention
to individuals with mental retardation.

3
the ABA Death Penalty Representation Project to
provide training and technical assistance to judges
and lawyers in death penalty jurisdictions.4 And, in
1989, the ABA adopted policy stating “that no person
with mental retardation, as now defined by the
American Association on Mental Retardation, should
be sentenced to death or executed.” ABA Policy No.
110 (adopted Feb. 1989).5 This definition was: “Mental
retardation refers to significantly sub-average general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during
the developmental period.”6 The ABA reaffirmed this
position in 1997, when it adopted policy supporting a
suspension of executions until states had implemented
a number of reforms, including “preventing execution

4

Information on the ABA Death Penalty Representation
Project may be found at: http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
committees/death_penalty_representation.html.
5

ABA House of Delegates Resolution 110 (1989), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/
1989_my_110.authcheckdam.pdf. ABA policy must be adopted
by vote of the ABA’s House of Delegates (“HOD”). Today, the
HOD includes more than 560 delegates representing states
and territories, state and local bar associations, affiliated
organizations, ABA sections and divisions, and the Attorney
General of the United States, among others.
See ABA
Leadership, House of Delegates, General Information, available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/leadership/house_of_
delegates.html.
6

ABA House of Delegates Resolution 110 (1989), supra note 5
(quoting American Association on Mental Retardation,
CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 1 (H. Grossman ed.,
1983)).

4
of mentally retarded persons.” ABA Policy No. 107
(adopted Feb. 1997).7
Following this Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002), the ABA:
• In 2003, revised the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases (“ABA Guidelines”), to
emphasize the importance for counsel working
with mental disability professionals to
understand potential issues of mental
retardation, and to collect, develop and present
evidence regarding the client’s mental
retardation, cognitive limitations and learning
disabilities, which are relevant to potential
defenses;8
• In 2003, published Mental Retardation and the
Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative
Issues, which included model legislation
7

ABA House of Delegates Resolution 107 (1997), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/
1997_my_107.authcheckdam.pdf.
8

ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 1989, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Dea
th_Penalty_Representation/Standards/National/1989Guidelines.
authcheckdam.pdf; ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 2003 revisions,
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/un
categorized/Death_Penalty_Representation/Standards/National/
2003Guidelines.pdf. The ABA Guidelines were first adopted in
1989 to “amplify previously adopted Association positions on
effective assistance of counsel in capital cases,” and to
“enumerate the minimal resources and practices necessary to
provide effective assistance of counsel.” ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,
1989.

5
showing how states could implement the
Atkins decision;9
• In 2003, established, through its Section on
Individual Rights and Responsibilities
(“IR&R”), the Task Force on Mental Disability
and the Death Penalty (“Task Force”), which
was composed of 24 lawyers and mental health
practitioners and academics, including
members of the American Psychiatric
Association and the American Psychological
Association, to examine the imposition of the
death penalty on persons with mental
retardation and other mental, psychological, or
psychiatric conditions and limitations;10
• In 2006, adopted as policy the conclusion of
IR&R’s Task Force that defendants “should
not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the
time of the offense, they had significant
limitations in both their intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior, as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical
adaptive skills, resulting from mental
retardation . . . ;”11 and
• Between 2006 and 2013, through the ABA’s
Death Penalty Due Process Review Project,
9

James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A
Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 13 (2003), available at www.death
penaltyinfo.org/documents/MREllisLeg.pdf.
10

See ABA House of Delegates Resolution 122A (2006),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/direct
ories/policy/2006_am_122a.authcheckdam.pdf (adopting the Task
Force’s proposal).
11

Id.

6
conducted assessments of the operation of the
death penalty in twelve states, including
Florida, that together represent almost 65% of
the executions that have been carried out since
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 123 (1976). These
assessments include analyses of whether a
state has implemented procedures and
properly trained counsel to determine whether
a capital defendant or death row inmate has
mental retardation and thus cannot be subject
to the death penalty.12
Based on these and other examinations by the ABA of
the issues involved in the application of the death
penalty to individuals with mental retardation, the
ABA submits this amicus brief to assist the Court in
considering whether Florida has established a
constitutionally reliable test for determining whether
a defendant who has asserted mental retardation
should nevertheless be eligible for the death penalty.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Atkins, this Court concluded that a national
consensus had developed against the execution of
persons with mental retardation and that such
executions violated the Eighth Amendment. The
Court also stated that the national consensus suggests
that some characteristics of mental retardation, such
as disabilities in the areas of reasoning, judgment, and
control of impulses, undermine the procedural
protections of our capital punishment jurisprudence
and can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of

12

A copy of all assessments may be found at: http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/individual_rights/projects/death_penalty_
due_process_review_project/death_penalty_assessments.html.

7
capital proceedings against defendants with mental
retardation.
Although the Atkins Court left to the states the task
of determining whether a defendant has mental
retardation, the Court noted its approval of state
statutory definitions that generally conform to the
clinical definitions of professional mental disability
organizations, such as the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)
(formerly the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR)) and the American Psychiatric
Association (APA).13
In the eleven years since Atkins was decided, states
have taken differing approaches to fulfilling this
mandate. Many of these states have followed Atkins’
guidance and have implemented tests that, consistent
with the definitions used by recognized mental
disability organizations, consider assessments of both
an individual’s intellectual functioning (i.e., IQ tests),
including the standard margin of error or specific facts
about the administration and scoring of the test, and
an individual’s conceptual, social and practical skills.
Florida courts, however, have adopted a test that
individuals who have a raw IQ score above 70 do not
have mental retardation, without consideration of the
standard margin of error or factors including cognitive
and behavioral impairments that are encompassed in
the definitions of mental disability professionals. In
13

The AAIDD defines mental retardation as “a disability
characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual
functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers many
everyday social and practical skills.”
Definition, AAIDD,
available at http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#
.UrJVfNJDs2c.

8
doing so, Florida has erected a test with no foundation
in scientifically recognized definitions that prevents
an accurate assessment of whether a defendant has
mental retardation and allows for the execution of
individuals with mental retardation who would not be
executed in states that have followed Atkins’ guidance.
This, the ABA asserts, is an arbitrary and capricious
application of the death penalty that denies the
constitutional protection mandated by Atkins for the
full range of defendants with mental retardation.
ARGUMENT
FLORIDA SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO
UNDERMINE ATKINS V. VIRGINIA BY
ERECTING
A
TEST
THAT
PREVENTS
ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF A DEFENDANT’S
MENTAL RETARDATION.
A. The Rights of Defendants with Mental
Retardation Warrant the Utmost
Constitutional Protection.
In Atkins, the Court held that the execution of
defendants with mental retardation violated the
Eighth Amendment and that “the Constitution ‘places
a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take
the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” 536 U.S. at
321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405
(1986)). This holding was based on a “national
consensus” against the execution of these defendants,
which provided “powerful evidence that today our
society views mentally retarded offenders as
categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”
Id. at 316. In addition, the Court was “not persuaded
that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will
measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive
purpose of the death penalty.” Id. at 321. As the Court

9
explained, “[i]f the culpability of the average murderer
is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction
available to the State, the lesser culpability of the
mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that
form of retribution.” Id. at 319. And, “the same
cognitive and behavioral impairments that make
these defendants less morally culpable” make it less
likely that the possibility of execution will act as a
deterrent. Id. at 320.
In addition, the Court stated that the national
consensus “suggests that some characteristics of
mental retardation undermine the strength of the
procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence
steadfastly guards.” Id. at 317. These characteristics,
such as “disabilities in the areas of reasoning,
judgment, and control of their impulses,” moreover,
“can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital
proceedings against mentally retarded defendants.”
Id. at 306-07.
The ABA respectfully asserts that any defendant
claiming mental retardation should be entitled to
establish “the lesser culpability of the mentally
retarded offender,” id. at 319, pursuant to a
constitutionally appropriate test that evaluates both
the defendant’s level of intellectual functioning and
his or her conceptual, social and practical adaptive
skills. As is well established in the legal literature and
by the ABA’s work in this field, defendants with
mental retardation may:
• mask their disability, making it difficult for
counsel to realize that the client is an
individual with mental retardation;14
14

See, e.g., ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.5 (“Relationship with
the Client”), Commentary at 1009 n.183 (overcoming barriers to

10
• find it difficult to recall information that will
aid counsel, or have difficulty answering openended questions;15
• act as if they understand their attorneys,
adapt responses in favor of what they believe
attorneys want them to say, or provide
answers that are unrelated to the actual facts
of the crime;16 and

communication and establishing rapport with defendant are
critical to effective communication and to obtain vital
information, an important example of which is the fact that the
client is mentally retarded – a fact that the client may conceal
with great skill, but one which counsel absolutely must know)
(citing James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 430-31 (1985)
and Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321). See also Denis W. Keyes et al.,
Mitigating Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the
“Invisible” Defendant, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITIES L.
REP. 529, 531 (1998); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competency of
Defendants with Mental Retardation to Assist in Their Own
Defense, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL
RETARDATION 97, 99-100 (Ronald W. Conley, et al., eds., 1992).
15

See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 14, at 428-29. (“Because
few mentally retarded people are able to determine what
information might have legal significance for their case,
spontaneous memory and cursory questioning cannot reliably
ascertain all the facts.”); see also Robert Perske, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE 15-16 (1991).
16

See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 14, at 428-29. (“Clients
with mental retardation tend to act as though they understand
their attorneys when they do not, and to bias their responses in
favor of what they believe their attorneys want them to say in the
direction of concrete, though inaccurate, responses.”).
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• be unable to monitor defense counsel’s
performance or involve themselves in the
defense strategy, as they do not comprehend
the criminal justice process.17
Florida’s test does not provide adequate protection
against any of these risks to the procedural protections
of our capital jurisprudence or to “the reliability and
fairness of capital proceedings against mentally
retarded defendants.” Id. at 306-07. As discussed
below, Florida’s assumption that a defendant with
severe social, cognitive, or behavioral impairments is
capable of meaningfully participating in his or her
defense solely because he or she has an IQ test result
above 70 is scientifically unjustifiable and results in
an arbitrary and capricious application of the death
penalty.
B. Florida’s Test Undermines Atkins.
In Atkins, the Court left to the “[s]tates the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction” on execution of those who
suffer from mental retardation. 536 U.S. at 317. The
Court, however, did not suggest that states could
undermine Atkins through the use of tests that do not
comport with scientific consensus, and accordingly, do
not afford the protection of the Eighth Amendment to
17

See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants with Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own
Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 423 (1990) (“fairness
of adjudication in most cases involving defendants with mental
retardation depends largely on the ability and inclination of the
attorney to recognize and to compensate for the client’s
limitations” and “the risks of inadequate representation are
magnified when the client has mental retardation . . . because the
client is in no position to monitor the attorney’s performance even
in a superficial way”).

12
the full range of individuals with mental retardation.
Untethered from scientifically accepted definitions of
mental retardation, Florida’s test results in
individuals with mental retardation in Florida being
excluded from constitutional protection properly
afforded to them in other jurisdictions.
1. Florida’s
Test
Ignores
Atkins’
Guidance on the Use of Scientifically
Accepted Definitions of Mental
Retardation.
Implicit in the Court’s delegation to the states was
the Court’s guidance that “[t]he statutory definitions
of mental retardation are not identical, but generally
conform to the clinical definitions set forth [by the
AAMR (now the AAIDD) and the APA].” Id. at 317
n.22 (citing id. at 309 n.3). These “clinical definitions
of mental retardation require not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant
limitations in adaptive skills such as communication,
self-care, and self-direction . . . .” Id. at 318.
In the eleven years since Atkins, the vast majority of
states have implemented rules that are consistent
with the definitions used by mental disability
professionals in considering a defendant’s intellectual
functioning. Many states, for example, allow courts to
consider the standard margin of error or specific facts
about the administration and scoring of IQ tests.18 A
18

For example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that
a defendant’s raw IQ test scores are not to be treated at “face
value” and has permitted defendants to introduce evidence
regarding these scores, including margins of error. See Coleman
v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 242, 247 (Tenn. 2011). See also State v.
Pruitt, 2013 WL 5530772, at *17 (Tenn. 2013) (stating that
experts may testify to the AAIDD recognized “challenges to the
reliability and validity of I.Q. test scores, among which are the

13
number of other states have recognized that a
conclusion regarding whether an individual has
mental retardation requires a multi-faceted analysis.19
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in
Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624, 631 (Pa. 2005),
“[i]t is the interaction between limited intellectual
functioning and deficiencies in adaptive skills that
establish mental retardation.”
In contrast, Florida’s test relies only on a raw IQ
score and ignores both the standard margin of error
and the relevant scientific evidence of mental
retardation (such as adaptive skills) that are included
standard error of measurement, the Flynn Effect, and the
practice effect.”). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Indiana
considered both margins of error associated with a defendant’s
tests and expert testimony regarding the test’s administration.
State v. Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d 90, 104-06 (Ind. 2005). Arizona’s
statutory definition of mental retardation similarly takes into
account the “margin of error for the test administered.” Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-753(K)(5).
19

See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 653 S.E.2d 31, 35 (Ga. 2007)
(stating that “Georgia’s statutory definition of mental retardation
is consistent with the clinical definitions relied upon in Atkins”
and that “there are no ‘hypertechnical’ requirements that a
defendant have certain test scores in order to be found mentally
retarded”); Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 20, 30 (Mo. 2006)
(applying definition of mental retardation from DSM-IV in
evaluating whether defendant had “significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning”); Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624,
629-32 (Pa. 2005) (consistent with the AAIDD and APA
definitions, court would “not adopt a cutoff IQ score for
determining mental retardation in Pennsylvania, since it is the
interaction between limited intellectual functioning and
deficiencies in adaptive skills that establish mental retardation”);
State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002) (an IQ test is
“one of the many factors that need to be considered” and alone is
“not sufficient to make a final determination on the issue [of
mental retardation]”).

14
in the definitions adopted by mental disability
organizations. With no foundation in scientifically
recognized definitions, Florida’s rigid test necessarily
excludes individuals with mental retardation whom
the Court expressly intended to receive constitutional
protection.
This type of nullification has been rejected by this
Court, which has held that this Court’s decisions “can
neither be nullified openly and directly by state
legislators . . . nor nullified indirectly . . . through
evasive schemes . . . .” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17,
18 (1958). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”).
2. By Preventing Accurate Assessment
of a Defendant’s Mental Retardation,
Florida’s Test Results in the
Arbitrary
and
Capricious
Imposition of Death Sentences.
Florida’s failure to adopt a scientifically-based
definition of mental retardation means that the same
individual could be eligible for the death penalty in
Florida, but not in another state that defines mental
retardation in a scientifically valid manner.
Indeed, under Florida’s test, the courts below were
foreclosed from considering both Mr. Hall’s IQ score as
a range, based on the standard error of measurement,
and his deficits in adaptive behavior, as set out in the
definitions of the AAIDD and APA. Instead, they were
required to consider only whether Mr. Hall’s IQ score
was below a bright-line cut-off of 70. See Hall v. State,
109 So.3d 704, 719-20 (Fla. 2012) (Perry, J.,

15
dissenting). In contrast, in State v. Gumm, the Court
of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the trial court’s determination that a defendant successfully established
mental retardation through expert evidence concerning the standard error of measurement, where the
defendant had IQ test scores ranging between 67 and
79. 864 N.E.2d 133, 136-40 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).21
20

While Atkins left the states leeway in determining
mental retardation, Florida’s rigid and unscientific
test is not consistent with Atkins, nor is it consistent
with basic notions of fairness. See Pruitt v. State, 834
N.E.2d 90, 108 (Ind. 2005) (“Although Atkins
recognized the possibility of varying state standards of
mental retardation, the grounding of the prohibition
in the Federal Constitution implies that there must be
at least a nationwide minimum.
The Eighth
Amendment must have the same content in all United
States jurisdictions.”); Lois A. Weithorn, Conceptual
Hurdles to the Application of Atkins v. Virginia, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1230 (2008) (“Rigid rules that
result in arbitrary decisions—such as Florida’s
categorical refusal to consider the standard error of
measurement-promote unfairness and undercut the
public’s trust in our system of justice.”); cf. Kennedy v.
20

See also ABA, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State
Death Penalty Systems: The Florida Death Penalty Assessment
Report, ABA DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW PROJECT 368
(Sept. 2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida/report
.authcheckdam.pdf.
21

See also ABA, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State
Death Penalty Systems: The Ohio Death Penalty Assessment
Report, ABA DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW PROJECT 37172 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratorium/ohi
o_chapter13.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (discussing the
need to avoid “arbitrary and capricious application” of
the death penalty).
This Court’s holding in Atkins is clear—the
execution of an individual with mental retardation
violates the Eighth Amendment. 536 U.S. at 321. As
results from the ABA’s Death Penalty Due Process
Review Project—and this case—have shown, however,
Atkins’ holding has not guaranteed that individuals
with mental retardation will not unlawfully be found
eligible for the death penalty when a state’s definition
of mental retardation is not in accord with scientific
understanding of mental retardation.22
In disregarding Atkins’ guidance concerning the definitions
used by recognized mental disability organizations in
determining whether an offender has mental
retardation, Florida has erected a test that prevents
accurate assessment and poses the grave―and
unacceptable―risk that individuals with mental
retardation will be unconstitutionally executed. This,
the ABA asserts, results in an arbitrary and capricious
application of the death penalty that denies the
constitutional protection mandated by Atkins for all
defendants with mental retardation.

22

See ABA, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State Death
Penalty Systems: The Florida Death Penalty Assessment Report,
supra note 20.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Amicus Curiae the
American Bar Association respectfully submits that
the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court should be
reversed.
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